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ABSTRACT
Research on the CHREC Space Processor (CSP) takes a multifaceted hybrid approach to embedded space
computing. Working closely with the NASA Goddard SpaceCube team, researchers at the National Science
Foundation (NSF) Center for High-Performance Reconfigurable Computing (CHREC) at the University of Florida
and Brigham Young University are developing hybrid space computers that feature an innovative combination of
three technologies: commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices, radiation-hardened (RadHard) devices, and faulttolerant computing. Modern COTS processors provide the utmost in performance and energy-efficiency but are
susceptible to ionizing radiation in space, whereas RadHard processors are virtually immune to this radiation but are
more expensive, larger, less energy-efficient, and generations behind in speed and functionality. By featuring COTS
devices to perform the critical data processing, supported by simpler RadHard devices that monitor and manage the
COTS devices, and augmented with novel uses of fault-tolerant hardware, software, information, and networking
within and between COTS devices, the resulting system can maximize performance and reliability while minimizing
energy consumption and cost. NASA Goddard has adopted the CSP concept and technology with plans underway to
feature flight-ready CSP boards on two upcoming space missions.
certain requirements to satisfy others. A common
design strategy for many space computers is to
exclusively use RadHard (i.e., radiation-hardened)
components for all subsystems. While this approach
will almost certainly result in a reliable system, the
compromises in performance, size, weight, power, and
cost are far from insubstantial. Another design strategy,
for missions in which requirements are not as stringent,
is to entirely use COTS (i.e., commercial off-the-shelf)
components. While an all-COTS solution might
perform admirably in all other requirements, the
reliability of the system is likely to be poor in a space
environment.

1 INTRODUCTION
On-board computing is among the most critical needs
of current- and future-generation spacecraft. The
requirements for processing devices in spacecraft are
being driven by two major application areas: (1) sensor
processing (e.g. signal, image, and video compression
and processing); and (2) autonomous processing and
control (e.g., autonomous rendezvous, docking, and
formation flying). Due in large part to sensor, control,
and mission-scope advancements in spacecraft systems,
future-generation space computers will be tasked with a
much more considerable processing load than those in
present-generation spacecraft, but they will continue to
be constrained by the complex requirements to which
all space systems must adhere, including both ionizingradiation effects and stringent restrictions on size,
weight, and power.

Among the research goals of the CHREC Space
Processor (CSP) project is the determination of a
method by which we can intelligently combine
RadHard and COTS components to produce a hybrid
computing system which has both more computational
performance (among other benefits) than an equivalent

Current-generation space processors tend to permit
considerable, and perhaps unnecessary, compromises in
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all-RadHard system, and higher reliability than an
equivalent all-COTS system. Additionally, the CSP
project is concerned with researching how best to apply
the principles of fault-tolerant computing to augment
the inherent reliability of a mixed RadHard and COTS
computing solution for varying mission needs.

reliability resulting from a lack of ionizing-radiation
effects is generally perceived to be worth the costs for
certain applications.
Table 1: Normalized Performance of Zynq-7020
versus Common RadHard Processors [3]
Baseline Devices

The realization of this research, the first production
version of the CHREC Space Processor (CSPv1), is
presented here. CSPv1 is a small computer that features
an innovative combination of three technologies: COTS
devices; RadHard devices; and novel fault-tolerant
computing techniques. By featuring COTS devices to
perform the critical data processing, supported by
simpler RadHard devices that monitor and manage the
COTS devices, and augmented with novel fault-tolerant
computing (in the form of hardware, software,
information, networking, and time redundancy) within
and between COTS devices, the resulting system can
maximize performance and reliability while minimizing
energy consumption and cost. CSPv1 is also designed
to be scalable in application scope—by the use of
multiple CSP cards in a system, most any computing
performance requirement can be accommodated, from
CubeSats to large spacecraft. We will detail a number
of the strategies and design decisions involved in the
creation of CSPv1 in two categories, those concerning
hardware architecture and those concerning software
architecture.

Performance Parameter
(Ratio of Zynq to Baseline)
Computation Performance
(32-bit integer)

591.8

178.0

591.8

Computation Performance
(32-bit floating-point)

1549.6

291.3

484.2

Performance per Watt
(32-bit integer)

235.5

236.1

1193.2

Performance per Watt
(32-bit floating-point)

549.6

344.4

870.2

Input / Output
Bandwidth

73.9

56.3

560.4

External Memory
Bandwidth

106.6

40.1

No EMB

Broadly categorized, there are two different types of
ionizing-radiation effects which are of concern for
integrated circuits. The first is the consequences which
are as a result of long-term exposure to a large number
of highly-energetic particles. The degree of this
exposure is quantified by the Total Ionizing Dose
(TID). The second type of effect which concerns
integrated circuits is the result of highly energetic
particles hitting critical areas of the die, causing
temporary changes in the state of the device (though
these temporary changes have the potential to cause
permanent damage if unmanaged). These are referred to
as single-event effects, of which there are several
subcategories.

2 BACKGROUND
The conventional wisdom in designing a spaceprocessing system is that, in order to ensure system
reliability, it is necessary for all subsystems to be
RadHard. Some representative designs of this sort are
detailed in [1] and [2]. However, this approach is a
costly strategy in many respects. In terms of
performance per Watt, the processing devices in these
systems are typically several orders of magnitude worse
than modern commercial devices [3], and they also
have a large size and mass footprint. Additionally, they
are logistically costly, with lead times of several
months, and three orders of magnitude more expensive
than equivalent COTS devices.

A number of COTS devices are capable of withstanding
a fairly high TID, but COTS devices typically do not
have particularly strong single-event immunity [4].
Devices similar in complexity to the Zynq, which is
featured on CSPv1, have been tested and are known to
have TID ratings that permit them to easily operate in
low-earth orbit for a long period of time (on the order
of several years) [5][6][7]. So, if the single-event
effects can be properly managed, these types of devices
have the potential to be viable for space systems.

A comparison, based on the data and methods of [3],
between a modern commercial processor (the Xilinx
Zynq-7020 selected for CSPv1), and several traditional
RadHard processors is given in Table 1. It is apparent
that the Zynq device considerably outperforms each of
these RadHard devices in all respects, including
performance per Watt — a very important metric for
space applications. Additionally, it is worth noting that
the Zynq device is much less expensive (on the order of
$100) than RadHard processors. However, use of
RadHard devices is pervasive, as the increased
Rudolph
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With regard to both fixed-logic and reconfigurablelogic devices, there is a great body of research
concerning how to correct and manage single-event
effects. Fixed-logic devices can track and correct
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memory errors through parity information and temporal
redundancy [8][9], and reconfigurable-logic devices
(subject to a different set of possible errors) can be
corrected and managed by means of periodic checking,
and possible scrubbing, of their configuration, along
with constructing hardware-redundant features in their
design [10][11][12]. Additionally, COTS devices can
be managed and monitored by means of external
hardware and supervisory circuits (as is the case for
CSPv1).

reliability is prioritized. Power-supply circuitry
generally falls under this category—even a very short
single-event effect which causes the output of the
supply to be out of specification can result in system
failure. The way that CSP discriminates between
devices which should be RadHard and those which
need not be RadHard can be summarized as:
If ionizing radiation effects of either type are a
concern, and the device cannot be easily monitored
and managed, then it should be made RadHard.

3 HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE
The result of applying the above rule is that power
supplies, supervisors, and sequencing circuitry are
made RadHard, but the main processing device and its
memory are not, as they can be monitored and
corrected. Fortunately, the application of this rule
results in a RadHard set of devices which are fairly
simple in construction, and so result in a lessened
degree of compromise.

The hardware of CSPv1 is designed to fit inside a 1U
CubeSat form factor (10 cm by 10 cm), and is mated
with the surrounding system perpendicularly though a
backplane connector. The primary novelty of the
hardware is the possibility to selectively populate any
combination of RadHard and COTS components (for
the monitoring systems) on the same Printed Circuit
Board (PCB), permitting a spectrum of possible hybrid
boards for different mission requirements. An image of
the top side of this board (for the all-COTS variant) is
shown in Figure 1; the regions which are unpopulated
are reserved for RadHard components. Additionally,
CSPv1 makes use of a supervisor circuit to monitor the
processing device in the event of an upset for which the
processor is unable to internally accommodate.

Table 2: Unmonitored Devices
Device Type

COTS Vendor

RadHard Vendor

NAND Flash Memory

Spansion (1 GB)

3D-Plus (4 GB)

Switching Regulators

Texas Instruments

Peregrine Semi

Linear Regulators

Texas Instruments

Aeroflex

Intersil

Intersil

Power Sequencing

Texas Instruments

Texas Instruments

Reset Management

Texas Instruments

Texas Instruments

Supervisory

The devices on CSPv1 which cannot be easily
monitored are able to be populated with either RadHard
or COTS solutions. The vendors of these devices are
shown in Table 2. There are also some devices, the
monitored devices, which are always populated, and
these are shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Monitored Devices
Device Type

Figure 1: Top of all-COTS CSPv1 Board

Description

Processing Device

Xilinx

Zynq 7020, 485-ball BGA

Volatile Memory

Micron

512 MB (Total) DDR3

An ancillary benefit of the population strategy of CSP
is that low-cost development boards with all-COTS
population can be used for software development, and
the software need not change when moved to a flight
(hybrid RadHard and COTS) board. These lower-cost
development boards can be manufactured for about
$1k, while flight boards can be made for about $10k.

3.1 Device Selection
There are some types of COTS devices that might be
generally inadvisable to use in space systems in which
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3.2 Processor Architecture

3.4 System Integration

The Xilinx Zynq-7020 device used by CSPv1 contains
a dual-core ARM A9 processor, and a 28nm Artix-7
FPGA fabric. Attached to the ARM side of this device,
the CSP has 512 MB of DDR3 memory, with PCB
support for 1 GB. Some specifications of the Zynq are
given in Table 4.

All externally facing connections on a CSPv1 are made
through the 160-pin Samtec Searay connector. In
addition to debugging and control-flow signals, there
are 60 high-speed connections from the FPGA portion
of the Zynq, and 26 high-speed connections from the
ARM portion of the Zynq. Of these 60 FPGA pins, 48
of them can be configured as (24) differential-pairs for
use with various high-speed interfaces. The ARM pins
can be configured to be most any combination of I 2C,
SPI, CAN, and UART interfaces, or used as GPIO.

Table 4: Xilinx Zynq-7020 Specifications
ARM Specifications
L1 Cache Per Core

32 KB Instruction / 32 KB Data

L2 Cache Shared

512 KB

Maximum Clock Frequency

667 MHz

FPGA Specifications
Programmable Logic Cells

85,000

Look-Up Tables

53,200

Flip-Flops

106,400

DSP Slices

220 (18 x 25 MACCs)

From a reliability perspective, the pairing of these two
architectures on a single die is of considerable utility
for a space computer. They are able to communicate
with and monitor each other, permitting a relatively
novel manner of fault-tolerance. The specifics of the
mechanisms of this fault-tolerance are given in the
section on software architecture.

Figure 2: CSPv1 Mated with Evaluation Board
For ground testing and evaluation, CSPv1 makes use of
an evaluation board with a considerable amount of
convenient circuitry to permit rapid development. This
board is shown, with a CSPv1 mated, in Figure 2. From
the CSP’s FPGA signals, the evaluation board provides
connectors for Camera Link, SpaceWire, and a number
of spare single-ended and differential signals. From the
CSP’s ARM signals, the evaluation board has gigabit
Ethernet, and USB Host, capability. A secondary
purpose of the evaluation board is to serve as a
reference design for the integration of various interfaces
and devices.

3.3 Hardware Reliability Assurance
A number of mechanisms for ensuring a reliable system
are designed into the hardware of CSPv1. One of these
mechanisms is a power-sequencing circuit (RadHard if
necessary) which serves two functions: (1) ensure that
the power rails are sequenced correctly; and (2) if a
regulator fails transiently, keep the Zynq in a protected
reset state and send a control-flow signal over the
connector so that appropriate recovery action can be
taken.
In the event of a software fault which is not recoverable
by software alone, the supervisory and reset
management circuits (all of which can be made
RadHard) will assist the Zynq to return to an
operational state. The principle on which these circuits
operate is continuously listening for a heartbeat signal
from the Zynq and, in the event of the Zynq failing to
provide this signal, the supervisory and reset
management circuits will reset the Zynq and allow it
appropriate time to boot up and send out the heartbeat
again.

Rudolph

A typical system which includes a CSPv1 will have a
passive backplane, to which one or more CSPs are
connected, along with a power-supply board to supply
the CSPs. CSPv1 requires the input of two rails, 3.3
Volts and 5.0 Volts; the remaining voltages are
generated on-board. Some typical power requirements
for a single CSPv1 board, in different states, are given
in Table 5. Though the table does not reflect it, we do
anticipate that it is possible to produce FPGA designs,
likely with a large number of external interfaces, which
4

28th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

could bring the power-profile of the board up to around
4 Watts.

the system, and is responsible for configuring and
initializing the FPGA. As such, a great deal of care
must be taken to ensure that the ARM device boots up
properly. A number of precautions have been taken in
the hardware and software of CSPv1 to make sure that
this is the case. An outline of the boot sequence is
shown in Figure 3. There are two types of fallback
mechanism, depending on the stage in the sequence.

Table 5: CSPv1 Power Consumption
Clocks (MHz)

Test Load

ARM

DDR

FPGA

ARM

FPGA

Power (W)

200

200

100

Low

Low

1.54

200

200

100

High

Low

1.78

667

533

100

High

Low

2.23

667

533

100

High

High

2.86

4 SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
A body of software has been developed for, and applied
to, CSPv1 in order to both support it as a space
computer and improve system reliability. The specifics
of how software is used to improve reliability is
considerably different for each half (ARM and FPGA)
of the Zynq.

Figure 3: CSPv1 Boot Sequence
The first precaution in the boot-up sequence is a
method of verifying the correctness of boot images
contained in the non-volatile memory. The CSP
repurposes the RSA authentication features of the Zynq
to check boot images. The intended purpose of this
feature is tamper-prevention; however, it has proven
very capable of verifying the correctness of non-volatile
memory contents. Additionally, it is possible to use
fallback (an arbitrary number of times), if the image
from which the Zynq is trying to boot is corrupted.

4.1 Utility Software
In order to facilitate development of space applications,
a number of custom software components were
developed for CSP. CSPv1 runs a custom, lightweight,
Linux-based operating system on the ARM cores of the
Zynq which has extensions to support various
operations, such as FPGA scrubbing (detailed later)
which are necessary for reliable operation. Other
extensions include those enabling easy communication
with the FPGA side of the Zynq, which could, among
other things, allow the FPGA to be used as an
accelerator to the CPU program execution. It is also
worth noting that there are a number of options for
program acceleration with the Zynq. In addition to
FPGA-based acceleration, the Zynq also has a NEON
floating-point SIMD accelerator with each core, and the
two cores in the ARM allow either OpenMP-based or
MPI-based acceleration.

After the verification of a boot image, it is necessary to
ensure that this image will remain uncorrupted as it
moves to the volatile memory and is used by the
processor. Memory errors are logged and corrected
through several mechanisms at every level of the
memory hierarchy. At the lowest level, both the L1 and
L2 caches in the Zynq can trigger interrupts on parity
failure. In main memory, ECC can be enabled (halving
the usable memory capacity) which will automatically
detect two bits, and correct one bit, of error per word in
the DDR. Using error-detection and error-correction
extensions to the kernel, these DDR faults can also be
monitored and managed by software. Finally, in the
NAND flash, there are several features which will
likely ensure that no images, or scientific data, are
corrupted. The Zynq controller for the NAND device
has built-in support for ECC, and its reliability is
augmented by bad-block support.

Concerning flight software, CSPv1 has integrated the
Core Flight Executive (cFE) flight software framework
[13] (designed specifically for satellites and instruments
on embedded platforms) and the Core Flight System
(CFS) [13] from NASA Goddard. With these software
packages, a number of different applications for
commanding, telemetry gathering, scheduling, health
and safety, and file management are readily available.

During normal operation (after boot-up), there are
several measures to ensure correct program execution.
In addition to the external supervisory circuit, the Zynq
has three internal watchdogs (one for each ARM core,
and one which monitors device hardware) which can be
used to detect and correct faults. Additionally, several

4.2 ARM Software Reliability Assurance
Within the Zynq, the ARM processor is, to a degree, the
master device over the FPGA and other parts of the
system—it is connected to the non-volatile memory of
Rudolph
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fault-tolerant software techniques, including temporal
redundancy and program health monitoring, are to be
used on flight systems.

the new hardware circuitry. Before the scrubber
resumes, the golden frame data and mask information
associated with the partial reconfiguration is updated to
reflect a change in the hardware, so that future
scrubbing will not undo the partial reconfiguration.
Once scrubbing resumes, the new partial configuration
data is embedded in the golden file and will be used to
verify the contents of the FPGA circuitry.

4.3 FPGA Software Reliability Assurance
One of the challenges of deploying an FPGA system in
space is that its SRAM-based memory architecture
makes it susceptible to high-energy particles which can
cause corruption of the memory cells. A Single-Event
Upset (SEU), a common occurrence in space
environments, can lead to bit flips in configuration or
data memory of the FPGA which can eventually lead to
data errors or device failure if left unmitigated. This
hazard is also an issue for the CSP; however, corrective
measures have been included to prevent catastrophic
system failure. The solution is configuration scrubbing,
the process of quickly repairing these configuration bit
upsets in the FPGA before they can accumulate to the
point of rendering the device inoperable. Several
techniques for scrubbing have been deployed in space
missions [14], but each has tradeoffs with respect to
detection and correction time, coverage of upset
patterns, and fault localization.

4.4 System Reset Methodology
The supervisor circuit on CSPv1 will reset the Zynq if it
fails to put out a heartbeat signal. However, the exact
strategy of determining what should cause the Zynq to
stop outputting its heartbeat is a considerable research
topic and design decision. Nominally, the heartbeat
should stop only when the Zynq has encountered a fault
for which it is completely unable to recover without
assistance from the external circuit.
In order to achieve this outcome, the CSP uses a multilevel heartbeat. The externally facing heartbeat (which
is accepted by the optionally RadHard supervisor from
Intersil) is sourced from the FPGA, and is internally
connected to a number of different pseudo-heartbeats
from the different parts of the Zynq device. Some of
these pseudo-heartbeats come from the ARM side of
the chip (these are application health information), and
there are also pseudo-heartbeats from the different
instantiated FPGA hardware elements. The intent of
this scheme is that if some internally monitored element
fails, its manager will attempt to reset or reinitialize it,
and if that is not possible, the external heartbeat will
stop, triggering a full system reset.

The configuration scrubber within CSP uses a readback
strategy that continuously reads configuration data
frame by frame (FPGA configuration data is organized
into frames, with each frame consisting of 101 words or
3232 bits). Each configuration frame is compared to the
golden frame contents stored in main memory. The
golden frame data is generated by the vendor’s
bitstream-generation tools. A frame mask is also used
to mask configuration bits within a frame that are
known to change during operation. If a difference exists
between a non-masked bit within the readback frame
and the golden frame, the configuration frame is
overwritten with the contents of the golden frame. The
location (frame, word, and bit) of any upsets within the
configuration data is logged for post-processing and
error analysis.

5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced the CHREC Space
Processor (CSP) as a new approach based upon the
concept of hybrid space computing. By featuring COTS
devices to perform the critical data processing, and
simpler RadHard devices to monitor and manage the
COTS devices, and augmenting them both with novel
fault-tolerant computing techniques, CSP can maximize
performance and reliability while minimizing energy
consumption and cost, providing unprecedented
computing capability in space.

This scrubber only checks the configuration frames
associated with the logic portions of the configuration
bitstream (Block 0 frames). The configuration frames
associated with internal block memory or BRAM are
not scrubbed, since their contents change with normal
functionality. In addition, BRAMs can be protected
from SEUs by utilizing the built-in support of error
correction coding (ECC).

CSPv1, the first production version of CSP, is designed
to be selectively populated in various combinations of
RadHard and COTS on the same PCB board, permitting
a spectrum of possible hybrid boards for different
mission requirements. It is also designed to be scalable
in application scope — by the use of multiple CSP
cards in a system, most any computing performance
requirement can be accommodated, from CubeSats to
large space systems.

One of the unique features of the CSP scrubber is that it
supports partial reconfiguration of the FPGA logic. The
scrubbing process is paused during partial
reconfiguration to prevent the scrubber from “fixing”
the configuration memory. Partial reconfiguration is
then performed to update the configuration data with
Rudolph
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CSPv1 boards and their corresponding evaluation
boards are currently being tested by various industry,
government, and university groups partnered in
CHREC. Among these tests, CSPv1s (and the Zynq
chip on which they are based) are being evaluated, or
queued to be evaluated, for ionizing-radiation-induced
upset performance, thermal and vacuum performance,
and shock and vibration performance. The boards are
currently scheduled to fly on two upcoming missions
through NASA Goddard. One is a technology mission
(STP-H5/ISEM) on the International Space Station in
which two CSPs will be paired together to evaluate
hardware performance and collaborative algorithms in a
space setting. The second (CeREs) is a heliophysics
science mission in which a single CSP will be
performing data processing in a small NASA satellite.
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